I think that my core problem with TADA is captured through an analogy between TADA and the Supreme Court's 1970s problems with capital punishment (in a Texas case of all places). I was going to start using this analogy, but perhaps it is more distracting than useful, given its very different factual and legal context. Still, the core due process problems are the same.
Branch v. Texas (1972)
In this case, SCOTUS stops all capital punishment in USA . It is not per se unconstitutional. It is not a problem “in principle.” The problem is “in application.” Capital punishment was “wantonly and freakishly imposed” because jury discretion was not guided or limited.
Gregg v. Georgia (1976)
Between 1972 and 1976 states amended their statutes. They specified factors for juries. They provided for appellate review of death sentences. In this case, SCOTUS upholds death penalty because risk of error has been constrained.
Summary
Like SCOTUS, I am not opposed to providers having the ability to refuse desired LSMT. Like SCOTUS, my focus is on (1) How the decision is made, and (2) Who should make it. In 1972, SCOTUS was not opposed to capital punishment itself, only to the method used to determine who was sentenced. Similarly, I am not opposed to a TADA-type law, only to how it is now applied.
Like SCOTUS, I am not opposed to providers having the ability to refuse desired LSMT. Like SCOTUS, my focus is on (1) How the decision is made, and (2) Who should make it. In 1972, SCOTUS was not opposed to capital punishment itself, only to the method used to determine who was sentenced. Similarly, I am not opposed to a TADA-type law, only to how it is now applied.


