On this blog, Professor Thaddeus Pope tracks judicial, legislative, policy, and academic developments concerning medical futility and the limits on individual autonomy at the end of life.

Monday, June 7, 2010

What Gary Coleman Case Teaches about Surrogate Decision Making


After Gary Coleman was admitted to the Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, his medical decisions were made by Shannon Price.  The hospital looked to her as his wife.  But Coleman and Price had divorced back in August 2008.  So, the question being asked was: "Should the hospital have looked to Price as Coleman's surrogate decision maker?"  (LA Times)

Coleman had an advance directive appointing Price as his healthcare agent.  Therefore, there is no need to turn to Utah's default decision making laws.  Instead, to determine whether the hospital did the right thing, we must look to Utah's advance directive statute.  The first step of the analysis is to determine whether the divorce constituted a revocation of the advance directive.  Utah Code 75-2a-1113(1)(f) provides that "By a decree of annulment, divorce, dissolution of marriage, or legal separation that revokes the designation of a spouse as an agent, unless: (i) otherwise specified in the decree; or (ii) the declarant has affirmed the intent to retain the agent subsequent to the annulment, divorce, or legal separation."  

In short, divorce does undo the agency of an ex-wife, unless the principal specifically wants to retain the ex-wife as agent.  Did Coleman express any such desire?  He was still living with Price.  Is that enough?  Was the advance directive completed after the date of the divorce?  If so, that would probably be enough.  There are not sufficient publicly available facts to determine whether there was a revocation.  But we can complete out analysis without answering the revocation question. 

Whatever the outcome of the first step of the analysis, the second step is dispositive.  Utah Code 75-2a-1114 provides that the facility can look to Price so long as it has a "good faith belief" that Price has the authority she asserts.  So, at the implementation stage, actual authority does not matter as much as apparent authority.  Price said she was Coleman's wife.  She appeared to be Coleman's wife.  With no reason to doubt Price, the Utah hospital (as with hospitals everywhere) was entitled to trust her representations.

3 comments:

Sheba Seif said...

Thaddeus,

Regardless of whether the ex-wife had authority or not, the Utah Advance Health Care Directive (Utah Code Section 75-2a-117)states under Part 1: D. Agent's Authority: "If I cannot make decisions..., my agent has the power to make any health care decision I could have made such as, but not limited to:
. Consent to, refuse, or withdraw any health care....This authority is subject to any limits in paragraph F of Part 1 or in Part 11 of this directive."
Part 11 specifically states: "I want my health care providers to follow the instructions I give them when I am being treated, even if my instructions conflict with these or other advance directives." It then goes on to give 4 options. If Gary Coleman chose Option 2: "I choose to prolong life", as it appears he did, then how can any agent make the decision to pull the plug? In other words, is there something contradictory in the Utah Advance Directive Form that creates such a situation? So it is irrelevant whether they were divorced or not. The real issue here is what section of the advance directive should be legally binding. I hope you can shed some light on this for me. Thank you very much,

Sheba Seif

Thaddeus Mason Pope, J.D., Ph.D. said...

At the time I wrote this post, I had not seen the advance directive. If Price got her authority from the advance directive (and not as a default surrogate), then I agree that she is bound by the instructions in the advance directive unless (as many surrogates do) Coleman wanted Price to have discretion.

I defend just this point in a forthcoming article. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1551979

Sheba Seif said...

Thanks much